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Abstract
Along with the rapid economic growth since China undertook economic reform in 1978, the
income gap among Chinese regions has widened. Using CERD, a computable general equilib-
rium model of the Chinese economy with regional details, this paper investigates the impact
of China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation on regional development and ﬁnds that,
although all regions will gain from the accession, the trend of a widening gap among regions
will be reinforced rather than eased. Speciﬁcally, the eastern coastal region gains more than the
inland regions. The result is robust no matter whether the change in trade balance is left free
or ﬁxed, although the scenario with zero change in the trade balance generates a lower overall
welfare gain and an even worse regional disparity. A retreat from WTO commitments in tariff
cuts in agriculture reduces welfare gains, but could to some degree ameliorate the worsening
inequality between rural and urban households and between coastal and inland regions. How-
ever, this analysis incorporates only WTO commitments on tariff cuts and does not include
commitments on non-tariff barriers. Moreover, it does not model other domestic reforms that
may be adopted to offset the adjustment costs of the WTO commitments.
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1 Introduction
China was admitted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in November 2001, after making WTO
commitments which are far beyond those most member economies agreed to when they joined the
WTO (Lardy 2002). The accession ended a ﬁfteen-year long and difﬁcult negotiation process,
however, the discussion of the impact of China’s accession on the domestic and world economy has
only just begun.
Many studies discuss the impact of China’s accession using general equilibrium models because
these models enable panoramic analysis of economy-wide effects.1 These studies share the view
that, overall, China will achieve gains in economic efﬁciency but that agriculture, the auto industry
and the banking system are vulnerable sectors.
Few studies have tried to investigate the impact of WTO accession on regional development. Yang
andHuang(1997)andJiang(2002a)usedifferenttypesofrepresentativehouseholdstoapproximate
the regional impacts of trade liberalisation and WTO accession. Diao, Fan, and Zhang (2002) and
Diao et al. (2002) present a general equilibrium model with partial disaggregation, i.e., distinguish-
ing nine different regions only for the agricultural sectors. Fan and Zheng (2000, 2001) discuss the
regional impact of trade liberalisation in their PRCGEM model following the top-down approach.
However, their analysis is incomplete because it attributes the regional impact only to the difference
in sectoral composition. One reason for this limitation is that constructing a multi-regional CGE
model of the Chinese economy requires detailed regional input-output, income, consumption and
trade data which are often difﬁcult to obtain.
Although difﬁculties exist, the regional impacts of WTO accession should be paid equal attention
to the sectoral impacts. It is an even more important issue in the following senses. First, China is
a big country with huge regional differences in geographic and economic terms, and the regional
income disparity worsened along with the economic reform and growth during the 1990s. This in-
come disparity has become so great that the central government announced the “West Development
Strategy” in 2000. Second, analysis of sectoral effects is a part of the investigation into the regional
effectsofWTOaccession, thereforearegionalanalysiscouldprovideamorecomprehensivepicture
of the effects.
This paper discusses the impact of WTO accession on China’s regional economies using a general
equilibrium model of the Chinese economy with regional details, CERD. The paper is organised
as follows. The next section discusses regional developments in China since it implemented its
1For example, see Li et al. (1998), Wang (2000), Ianchovichina and Martin (2001), Lloyd and Zhang (2001), Ander-
son, Huang, and Ianchovichina (2002), Diao, Fan, and Zhang (2002), Diao et al. (2002), Francois and Spinanger (2002),
and Yu and Frandsen (2002).
2Figure 1: Three Regions in Mainland China
economic reform policy in 1978, to provide background for the analysis. Section 3 describes the
structure of the CERD model. It is followed by the description and discussion of results of model
simulations of tariff cuts in line with WTO commitments. Finally, some conclusions and the future
direction of research are discussed.
2 Regional Income Disparities in China
2.1 Three Regions in Mainland China
It is widely accepted that mainland China can be divided into three regions according to their nat-
ural and economic conditions. The eastern coastal region includes the provinces of Beijing, Tian-
jin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and
Hainan; the central region includes Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi,
Henan, Hubei and Hunan; and the western region includes the remaining six provinces, three au-
tonomous regions and one municipality (Figure 1). The eastern region is the most populous and
richest region, while the western region is the poorest region. A brief description of these regions
is given in Table 1.
As observed by many authors (e.g. Wu 1999; Sun 2000; Sun and Parikh 2001), the income gap be-
tweenChina’scoastalandinlandregionshasbeenwideningsincetheeconomicreformsin1978. Of
the three regions deﬁned, the richest eastern coastal region experienced the fastest economic growth
3Table 1: Regional Characteristics
Indicator Eastern Central Western
1991 2000 1991 2000 1991 2000
Land area: 1,000km2 1303.3 2848.2 5425.6
percent 13.5 29.6 56.9
Population: million 536.2 439.4 286.7
percent 42.5 34.8 22.7
GDP: billion yuan 5774.0 2626.2 1320.3
percent 59.4 27.0 13.6
Per capita GDP 10768 5978 4606
Share of SOE (%) 61.5 46.2 77.0 71.1 82.5 77.0
Share of primary sector (%) 21.5 13.8 28.6 19.6 32.0 21.1
Transportation index (km/km2) 0.42 0.57 0.22 0.28 0.13 0.17
Education index 0.39 0.56 0.35 0.51 0.25 0.36
Open indexa 2.17 2.33 0 1.56 0 1.40
Marketisation indexb 6.52 6.65 4.88 4.95 3.19 3.42
a Open indexes are developed by D´ emurger et al. (2001), according to the type and number of various
special economic zones in each province. The number in 2000 is the index for 1998.
b Marketisation indexes are developed by Fan and Wang (2001), based on the relationship between gov-
ernment and ﬁrms, development of non state-owned sectors, development of product and factor markets,
and regulations. The values are respectively for years 1997 and 1999.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various volumes; D´ emurger et al. (2001); Fan and Wang (2001).
in the past two decades. The average per capita GDP in the eastern region increased seven-fold,
while per capita GDP in the poorest western region increased by less than ﬁve times. Consequently,
the gap in per capita GDP between the eastern and western regions increased from 380.6 yuan in
1978 to 3354.9 yuan in 2000 in real terms (Figure 2).
2.2 Patterns of Regional Income Disparity
Although the gap in per capita GDP between rich and poor provinces has been widening since 1978,
the values of relativity indicators (coefﬁcient of variance, Gini coefﬁcient and Theil index) in 2000
were more or less the same as in 1978. This suggests that regional income disparity in China is
mainly driven by overall economic development.
It can be seen from Figures 3 to 5 that the disparity pattern changed signiﬁcantly during the period
between 1978 and 2000. During the period 1978–90 the extent of regional disparity was unchanged
or even decreased for some indicators, but it increased signiﬁcantly during the period 1990–2000.
This observation is conﬁrmed by the estimation of beta convergence which measures how fast the
poor regions catch up to the rich ones (Table 2).2 There was weak beta convergence during the
period 1978 to 1990, while divergence can be observed for the period 1991 to 2000.
This pattern in regional income disparity is closely related to the economic reform and development
process in China. During the ﬁrst half of the ﬁrst period (1978–84) China successfully implemented
the agricultural reform scheme and, consequently, experienced high economic growth in the agri-
2The beta convergence can be estimated by lnYiT −lnYi0 = c−(1−e−bT)lnYi0+ei, where YiT and Yi0 are, respec-
tively, per capita GDP at time T and time 0; b is the beta convergent coefﬁcient; and e is the error term. Clearly, a
positive (negative) b indicates convergence (divergence).
4Figure 2: Per Capita GDP by Region





























































































































Source: Author’s construction based on data from various volumes of the China Statistical Yearbook.
cultural sector. Because the poorer provinces have higher agricultural shares in their output than
the richer provinces, the boom in agriculture helped to reduce the regional income gap. During the
second half of this period, China began urban economic reform and the opening up of the coastal
regions for foreign investment. But these reforms did not produce an immediate impact on regional
disparity.
During the second period (1991–2000) the urban reforms initiated in the late 1980s were broad-
ened and the reform effects have become evident. The most important effect is the decline of the
state-owned economy. Because the central and western regions have a higher share of state-owned
enterprises in their economy, their growth was hindered. On the other hand the eastern region
beneﬁted from the rapid growth of foreign investment and non-state-owned sectors.
5Figure 3: Coefﬁcient of Variance of Regional Per Capita GDP

















































































































￿ Unweighted coefﬁcient of variance of GDP per capita at current price








￿ Population weighted coefﬁcient of variance of GDP per capita at current price
Source: Jiang (2002a, Figure 4.1, p.46).
Figure 4: Gini Coefﬁcients












































































































￿ Unweighted Gini Coefﬁcient of GDP per capita at current price








￿ Population weighted Gini coefﬁcient of GDP per capita at current price
Source: Jiang (2002a, Figure 4.2, p.46).
Another feature of regional income disparity is that the degree of disparity decreases within each
of these regions while it increases between the regions, as shown in Figures 6 and 7. This outcome
is not only because these three regions have signiﬁcant differences in their natural and economic
conditions, but also because of the differentiated economic policies implemented in these regions.
6Figure 5: Theil Index of Regional Disparity in China





























































￿ Theil Index of GDP per capita at current price
Source: Jiang (2002a, Figure 4.3, p.47).
Table 2: Beta Convergence of per capita GDP in China, by regions, 1978–2000a
National Eastern Central Western
Period without with
dummyb dummyb region region region
1978–2000 0.254 (0.589) 1.077 (0.002) 0.882 (0.107) 2.122 (0.006) 1.786 (0.030)
1978–1990 0.690 (0.131) 1.242 (0.008) 1.077 (0.133) 1.739 (0.084) 2.270 (0.066)
1978–1984 0.956 (0.103) 1.493 (0.018) 1.136 (0.190) 2.637 (0.100) 3.649 (0.064)
1985–1990 0.330 (0.609) 1.079 (0.125) 0.907 (0.287) 1.023 (0.429) 3.158 (0.335)
1991–2000 -0.935 (0.177) 0.845 (0.089) 0.506 (0.428) 3.452 (0.020) 1.945 (0.225)
1991–1995 -1.239 (0.273) 1.896 (0.016) 1.595 (0.141) 5.496 (0.012) 1.714 (0.510)
1995–2000 -0.723 (0.072) -0.378 (0.477) -0.709 (0.307) 1.648 (0.402) 1.936 (0.253)
a The beta convergence ratio is in percentage terms; numbers in parenthesis are p-values.
b These are dummies included for the central and western regions.
Source: Jiang (2002a, Table 4.1, p.48).
As shown in Table 1 the loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and low value-added primary
sectors are dominant in the central and western regions, and their shares in the economy did not
decline as much as in the eastern region. The infrastructure in these regions, as represented by the
transportation index in Table 1, is relatively poor and did not improve very much during the past
decade.
As regards economic policy, it is often claimed that the central government has given “preferential
and favourable” policies to the coastal region, e.g., tax deductions and exemptions, and higher in-
vestment in infrastructure and production facilities. This is true, but it is not the complete story. The
special policies implemented in the coastal region also included policies that were aimed at increas-
ing economic efﬁciency, such as reducing the support to SOEs, opening up to external competition,
encouraging the development of more dynamic private sectors, etc. These policies lead the eastern
7Figure 6: Gini Coefﬁcient within and between Regions
(per capita GDP at 1978 prices)













































































































































% Western Region Between Regions
Source: Jiang (2002a, Figure 4.4, p.49).
Figure 7: Gini Coefﬁcient within and between Regions
(per capita GDP at current prices)
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Source: Jiang (2002a, Figure 4.5, p.50).
8region to be more open than the other regions, as indicated by the open and marketisation indices
in Table 1.
The regional differences in economic structure, technology and openness imply that WTO acces-
sion will have different impacts on regional economies. It was suggested that countries with a
more open policy tend to attract more foreign direct investment and have higher economic growth
(Bhagawati 1978; Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford 1996). This also applies to different
provinces in China. WTO accession means that domestic ﬁrms will receive less protection and be
exposed to more competition. The above discussion suggests that the WTO accession may have
more severe impacts on the inland regions than on the coastal region because the former regions
have an unfavourable economic structure and are not so ready to face competition from the out-
side world. This hypothesis will be examined using a general equilibrium model of the Chinese
economy in the following sections.
3 CERD:AGeneralEquilibriumModeloftheChineseEconomywith
Regional Dimensions
This section gives a brief introduction to the model of the Chinese economy used in the analysis.
For more details about the model, see Jiang (2002b).
3.1 Overview of CERD
As CERD suggests, it is a multi-regional model of the Chinese economy. In this study a simple
version of CERD is used, wherein Chinese provinces are grouped into three regions as described
in the previous section.3 Traditionally, a multi-regional model follows the so-called “top-down”
approach where a central model is solved and then a regional distribution is done using the shares
of the different regions. For example, the PRCGEM model (Fan and Zheng 2001) classiﬁes sectors
into local and national sectors. Local sectors produce products which are not tradable between
regions. Althoughnationalsectorsproducetradableproducts, itisassumedthatthesamepercentage
change in sectoral output applies to all regions. Therefore, the differences in regions’ responses to
the liberalisation are purely the structural effect, i.e., coming from the difference in the composition
of sectors in the regional economy.
By contrast, CERD uses the “bottom-up” approach. Each region in CERD is treated as an open
economy with its own agents and behavioural functions. As shown in Figure 8, agents in each
region make their decisions on the demand for and supply of commodities and primary factors, and
regional economies are linked through commodity and factor ﬂows.
It can be seen from the diagram that CERD mimics a global model of multiple regions like GTAP
(Hertel 1997). However, it has some peculiar features. First of all, regional links in CERD are more
intensive than in a global model, especially for the movement of primary factors. For example,
3The detailed version of the CERD model identiﬁes 28 regions, which correspond to one province, autonomous
region or municipality directly under the central government in mainland China, with exceptions where Hainan, Ninxia
and Tibet are included in, respectively, Guangdong, Gansu and Qinghai.






















in GTAP labour is immobile across countries, while CERD allows partial mobility across regions
within China. CERD assumes perfect mobility of capital across domestic regions and sectors.
As labour and capital can move across regional boundaries, it is important to distinguish between
the usage and ownership of these factors to better calculate regional household income and con-
sumption. This makes CERD superior to some CGE models.
Another feature of CERD is that rural and urban households are distinguished in each region accord-
ing to their possession of primary factors. This is very important and appropriate for the analysis
of the Chinese economy where rural and urban areas are still separated to some degree because of
various restrictions, although signiﬁcant improvements have been made. For example, the house-
hold registration system, which identiﬁes a person as a rural or urban resident, is still in effect and
prevents people from freely moving across regions, especially from the countryside to cities.
Another difference between CERD and global models is its treatment of regional links. Ideally,
inter-regional ﬂows of commodities and factors would be presented in the model, however, such
information is not available as there are no “customs” in each province to register “imports” from
and “exports” to other provinces. In order to avoid arbitrary decisions in creating the database,
CERD models inter-regional trade indirectly via a national pool of commodities and factors. Each
region sells its excess supply to and buys excess demand from the national pool (Figure 8).
CERD also distinguishes between regional and national governments, which allows for the analysis
of transfer payments.
Finally, CERD has a fairly detailed representation of commodities. There are 44 sectors in the
model, among which are 5 agricultural sectors, 25 industrial sectors, one construction sector, and
13 service sectors (see Table A.1).











3.2 Primary Factor Markets
3.2.1 Demand for Primary Factors
Each sector in each region is represented by a ﬁrm producing a single commodity. Perfect compe-
tition and constant returns to scale are assumed for all ﬁrms. The production is modelled by a nest
of technologies (Figure 9).
At the ﬁrst tier of the nest the technology is Leontif, that is, the production of a good requires
ﬁxed proportions of aggregated primary factors, or value added, and intermediate inputs. At the
second tier, the value added is an aggregation of labour, capital, and land with a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES). At the third tier, demand for different types of labour are determined. The
labour demand by non-agricultural sectors is a CES aggregation of rural, urban and migrant labour,
while agricultural sectors demand only rural labour. Therefore, there are four types of labour in the
demand side: “agri” labour which is rural labour used in agricultural sectors; and “rural”, “urban”
and “migrant” labour which are used in non-agricultural sectors (see Figure 10).
3.2.2 Supply of Primary Factors
Each household owns an endowment of primary factors, QFAH(v,h,r), and allocates the endow-
ment to different uses according to a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) process.
Labour is divided into rural and urban labour. Labour supplied by rural households can be used
in all sectors in their own region as well as in other regions, i.e., as migrant labour. By contrast,
laboursuppliedbyurbanhouseholdscanbeusedonlyinnon-agriculturalsectorsintheirownregion
(Figure 11). These assumptions are made based on the fact that currently there is a huge amount









































of surplus labour in rural areas and that urban households are not willing to engage in agricultural
activities. The supply of each type of labour is determined by the household’s endowment of labour,
the relative price of each type of labour, and the elasticity of transformation.
It is assumed that capital is perfectly mobile across regions and sectors, and there is no difference
between capital owned by rural households and that owned by urban households. Therefore, there
is no speciﬁc transformation function governing the supply of capital to each sector in each region.
Only a summation equation is needed to calculate the total supply of capital which will be equal to
total demand set by the market-clearing condition, and capital in every region has the same price.
Land is owned only by rural households. It is not mobile across regions but is partly mobile across
agricultural sectors. The imperfect mobility of land reﬂects both natural and policy restrictions
on land uses. For simplicity, it is assumed that land is not a production factor in non-agricultural
sectors. The supply of land to each (agricultural) sector is determined by a CET process, depending
on the household’s endowment of land, the relative price of land in each sector, and the elasticity of




















3.2.3 Factor Market Clearing
As shown in Figure 10, there are four types of labour on the demand side: rural labour used in
agricultural sectors; and rural, urban and migrant labour used in non-agricultural sectors. There are
also four types of labour on the supply side as shown in Figure 11: agricultural and non-agricultural
labour supplied by rural households; labour supplied by urban households; and migrant labour
supplied by rural households. The markets for the ﬁrst three types of labour on each side can be
cleared within one region, while migrant labour market clearing involves all regions.
As illustrated in Figure 12 migrant labour in the national pool is a CES aggregation of migrant
labour supplied by each region; then they are allocated to each region to meet the demand according
to a CET process.
Because capital is perfectly mobile across regions and sectors the market-clearing condition simply
equates the total demand and supply. On the other hand, land is partly mobile across agricultural
sectors within each region, and therefore its supply and demand should be matched for each (agri-
cultural) sector in each region.
3.3 Commodity Markets
3.3.1 Demand for Commodities
As shown in Figure 13, regional demand for a commodity, Q(i,r), is the sum of each ﬁrm’s de-
mand for intermediate goods, Q1(i, j,r), investment demand, Q2(i,r), and consumption demand of






The total demand is a CES aggregation of demand for imported and domestically produced goods,


























and the latter is in turn a CES aggregation of goods produced locally, i.e., in its own region, and
those from other regions (the national pool). This type of demand nesting has some advantages.
Firstly, it allows for different elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported goods and
between goods from different domestic regions. This reﬂects people’s perception that the domes-
tic market is more integrated than the global market. Secondly, as almost all models distinguish
between domestic and foreign products, this nesting permits the use of parameters in other models.
As introduced above, intermediate demand is proportional to the output level.
Each private household allocates its disposable income, which is the sum of returns to primary fac-
tors net of income tax and government transfer payments,4 into savings and consumption. Savings
is a ﬁxed proportion of disposable income, determined by the propensity to save. The remaining
disposable income is for consumption. The household’s consumption is modelled by a constant dif-
4It should be noted that each household’s income is calculated according to its possession rather than its use of
primary factors. This is necessary for the accuracy of regional income calculations because of the mobility of labour
and capital. It might lead, however, to some bias in the calculation because of migrant labour. Speciﬁcally, it may
underestimate (overestimate) income, and thus the consumption, of regions with net inﬂows (outﬂows) of migrant labour.
However, most migrant labour is seasonal, and migrants send most of their earnings back to their households. In this
sense, the current approach is more accurate than that based on the use of factors. If it is found that more migrants
choose to reside in their work place permanently the calculation could be adjusted by changing each household’s factor
endowment in the current framework.
14ference in elasticity (CDE) system. The CDE is more ﬂexible than the CES function for modelling
consumer behaviour, and is used by the GTAP model (Hertel and Tsigas 1997; Huff et al. 1997).
There are two levels of government: regional and central government. To simplify the treatment, it
is assumed that tax collections (except import tariffs and export taxes), government saving and con-
sumption are made by regional governments, while the central government serves only to transfer
payments to regional governments.5 Therefore, each regional government’s revenue is the regional
tax revenues plus transfers from the central government.
The regional government’s saving and consumption behaviour is similar to that of private house-
holds. First, a ﬁxed proportion of total government revenues is saved, according to the govern-
ment’s propensity to save. The remaining revenues are allocated to consumption, or transferred to
individual private households in the region. Once the expenditure on consumption is determined,
the government’s demand for individual commodities is determined according to a Cobb-Douglas
utility function.
Regional aggregated real investment is determined by the prices of capital returns relative to the
price of investment goods, and the elasticity of investment. It is assumed that the production of this
aggregate investment is a Cobb-Douglas function of individual commodities.
3.3.2 Sales of Products
Commodities produced by ﬁrms are sold to three destinations: local (regional) markets, other re-
gions in China, or overseas (export). The sales to each destination are modeled as a process with a
constant elasticity of transformation (CET). The sales to a destination are determined by the total
output of the commodity, the relative price of the commodity in each destination, and the elasticity
of transformation.
3.3.3 Commodity Market Clearing
The demand for local products is met by the sales of local ﬁrms. Demand for imported commodities
is supplied by the rest of the world, depending on the world market price and the elasticity of import
supply. The demand for products produced in other domestic regions is met in a way similar to the
migrant labour market illustrated by Figure 12. Each region’s sales to other regions enters a national
“pool”, and then is transformed to individual regions according to a CET process.
3.4 Closure
Endowments of primary factors are exogenous. There are labour slack variables to allow unem-
ployment. But in the simulations described below these slack variables are set to be zero, leaving
5If the central government was allowed to consume, in addition to the amount of goods it could consume, it should
also make decisions about where the commodities are bought and sold. This would unnecessarily increase the burden of
computation as this can be embodied in the decision making process of individual regional governments.
15wages to adjust for full employment.6
All tax rates including tariff rates and technological shifters are set exogenously. Exogenous tax
rates imply that government revenues will change along with changes in production, income and
trade after shocks. It differs from a closure where tax rates are adjusted so as to raise a ﬁxed
amount of revenues. The current closure is chosen because we want to identify the impact of WTO
accession from other policy changes. The share of transfer payments from central government to
regional governments does not change, i.e., payments to each region change at the same rate.
The propensities to save are ﬁxed, although they vary across households and regions. The difference
between national savings and aggregate investment is the net capital inﬂow, which is equal to the
trade deﬁcit. There are two closures in the following simulation: no control on the trade balance
and forcing the change in the trade balance to be zero. An interpretation of these two closures will
be given below.
3.5 Data
A peculiar feature of CERD is that its database has been compiled based on the provincial 44-sector
input-output tables for 1997. The 44-sector classiﬁcation follows the 40-sector classiﬁcation in the
1997 national input-output table (National Accounts Department 1999) with the agricultural sector
further disaggregated into ﬁve sectors. In total there are 28 provincial tables available.7 These
provincial input-output data have been aggregated into the three regions.
Other data and parameters are drawn from GTAP database 5, Yang and Huang (1997) and the China
Statistics Yearbook series.
4 Impact of WTO Accession on Regional Economies
China’s WTO accession document is exceptionally long. In brief, China has made a WTO-plus
commitment. It promised not only to reduce signiﬁcantly tariff and non-tariff barriers but also
to open up sectors such as telecommunications, banking, insurance, asset management and dis-
tribution to foreign investment. It also agreed to abide by all WTO rules. Moreover, China has
been forced to accept discriminatory treatment in two important rule-based areas: safeguards and
antidumping (Lardy 2002).
It is difﬁcult to accommodate all of China’s commitments in one simulation. Rather, this study
investigates the impact of the most obvious and simplest commitment: the required tariff cut. Even
thisisnotaseasyasitmayseem. China’simporttariffsareoftensubjecttoexemptionandreduction
under special arrangements which make the effective tariff rates signiﬁcantly different from the
6It should be noted that the treatment here implies no change in the employment (or unemployment) level embodied
in the database.
7Three provinces or autonomous regions, Hainan, Ningxia and Tibet, do not have input-output tables. These regions
are small in economic scale and their input-output data were constructed according to information about neighbouring
regions with similar natural and economic characteristics. Speciﬁcally, Hainan is included in Guangdong, Ningxia in
Gansu, and Tibet in Qinghai.
16statutory rates. For example, the average statutory tariff rate was 16.4 percent in 2000, while tariff
revenue accounted for only 4.03 percent of the value of imports (National Bureau of Statistics of
China 2001). However, the import and tariff data for individual products are not available to the
public, so it is impossible to calculate accurate effective tariff rates.
The database of the model represents the Chinese economy in 2000, with the average tariff rate be-
ing 16.2 percent, which is close to the statutory tariff rate.8 The tariff rates used in this study (Table
A.2) are mainly drawn from the GTAP Database 5 with some revisions based on other studies, e.g.
Wang (2000), Ianchovichina and Martin (2001) and Anderson, Huang, and Ianchovichina (2002).
The WTO tariff rates are only approximately consistent with the actual commitments (Annex 8:
Schedule CLII of Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China).
As introduced above, two closures are used in the simulation:
• No control on the trade balance. In this closure, the nominal exchange rate is ﬁxed, the trade
balance is endogenous and foreign capital ﬂows automatically match the balance.
• No change in the trade balance. In this closure, a ﬂoating exchange rate regime is assumed
so that the change in the trade balance can be exogenously ﬁxed at zero.9
One might think that the ﬁrst closure is the most natural one, involving only tariff cuts in the simu-
lation. However, it may still require some other policy changes to validate the closure. For example,
it requires capital inﬂows to match the trade deﬁcit at whatever level the model generates, implying
that there is no control on foreign investment. This is clearly not the case. But as it is expected that
foreign investment will increase after WTO accession (Chen 2001), and zero change seems too ex-
treme, one would expect that the real situation lies somewhere between the two closures, although,
perhaps, closer to the ﬁrst one.
In each closure, two scenarios are simulated. The ﬁrst one is the tariff cut set by China’s WTO
accession commitment. The second one is the same as the ﬁrst one except that the tariff cuts in
agricultural sectors are only half of the level in the ﬁrst scenario. This scenario attempts to capture
some policy reactions in China aiming at protecting agriculture after WTO accession. Many studies
of China’s WTO accession have projected that agriculture is one of the hardest hit sectors, so the
Chinese government (and academic circles) has been worrying about this issue and adopted some
measures to anticipate the detrimental outcomes.10 One of the measures is to impose higher tech-
nical standards on imports.11 These measures provide additional protection to agriculture, being
equivalent to smaller tariff cuts in agricultural sectors.
8Although this is higher than the effective rate, it may represent the actual protection level if considering non-tariff
barriers. Moreover, the effective rate tends to underestimate the actual protection level as it is weighted by import
volumes.
9It could be set at any level, but zero change is an obvious target.
10The problem of so-called San Long (agriculture, farmers and rural development) has been a popular topic.
11For example, the newly implemented reporting requirement for genetically modiﬁed food is interpreted as an im-
portant tool to protect China’s traditional soybean growing areas in the northeastern region against competition from the
US. However, it should be pointed out that these practices have been learnt from other countries. China often complains
that its exports face even stricter technical barriers.
17Table 3: Macroeconomic Effects of Tariff Cuts–No Control on Trade Balance
WTO agreement WTO agreement plus agricultural protection
Indicators Eastern Central Western National Eastern Central Western National
Real GDP (%) 0.87 -0.06 0.33 0.56 0.77 -0.10 0.28 0.48
GDP deﬂator (%) -1.90 -2.03 -2.79 -2.07 -1.74 -1.82 -2.53 -1.89
CPI (%)
Rural households -2.66 -2.50 -3.11 -2.70 -2.24 -2.12 -2.62 -2.28
Urban households -2.56 -2.27 -2.77 -2.53 -2.23 -2.05 -2.51 -2.24
Government -0.67 -1.30 -1.33 -0.95 -0.77 -1.39 -1.44 -1.04
Regional average -2.61 -2.40 -2.95 -2.62 -2.24 -2.09 -2.57 -2.26
Total utility (%)
Rural households 0.67 0.22 0.17 0.46 0.91 0.44 0.49 0.70
Urban households 1.85 1.16 1.36 1.62 1.58 0.91 1.09 1.35
Government 0.49 -1.94 -2.47 -0.37 0.24 -1.92 -2.42 -0.53
Regional average 1.19 0.30 0.48 0.86 1.10 0.33 0.44 0.81
Equivalent variation (billion yuan)
Rural households 11.86 2.32 0.83 15.01 16.02 4.68 2.34 23.04
Urban households 38.68 7.89 9.79 56.35 33.05 6.20 7.84 47.08
Government 5.57 -6.84 -6.40 -7.67 2.67 -6.76 -6.28 -10.36
Regional sum 56.11 3.36 4.22 63.69 51.75 4.12 3.89 59.76
Savings (nominal, %)
Rural households -1.47 -2.03 -2.64 -1.76 -1.03 -1.59 -1.98 -1.30
Urban households -0.14 -1.07 -1.04 -0.48 -0.30 -1.19 -1.19 -0.64
Government -3.45 -3.26 -3.78 -3.44 -3.59 -3.32 -3.84 -3.58
Regional average -1.02 -1.66 -1.41 -1.22 -0.97 -1.46 -1.38 -1.14
Nominal exchange rate 0 0
Change in trade balance (billion yuan) -42.55 -34.42
Terms of trade (%) -0.46 -0.42
Simulation results of the tariff cut can be found in Tables 3 to 6 and A.3 to A.8. Tables 3 and 5
report the macroeconomic effects of tariff cuts under different closures, and Tables 4 and 6 report
the impact of tariff cuts on regional output, imports and exports of aggregated commodities or
sectors, while the disaggregated sectoral results are reported in Tables A.3 to A.8.
4.1 No Control on Trade Balance
4.1.1 Effects of tariff cuts implied by the WTO accession agreement
It can be seen from Table 3 that China has a net gain from the WTO accession. By cutting the
tariff rates as listed in Table A.2, China’s real GDP increases by 0.56 percent, utility increases by
0.86 percent, and the equivalent variation, a welfare indicator, reaches 63.69 billion yuan. Higher
welfare comes from higher real incomes, thus higher real consumption and saving. But the tariff cut
has an adverse impact on the trade balance and the terms of trade. China’s trade balance declines by
42.55 billion yuan because imports increase more than exports, and the terms of trade decreases by
0.46 percent. This is because the tariff cut does not affect the import price (CIF). However, Chinese
exports become cheaper because tariff cuts help to lower production costs.
The simulation also conﬁrms the perception that the impact will not be evenly distributed. The
motor vehicle and other transport equipment sector is the biggest loser, with output declining by
16.37 percent. It is followed by food and tobacco processing, chemicals and machinery sectors,
with output declining more than 3 percent. The impact on the agricultural sectors is not as severe
as some studies have suggested. Crops output decreases by 1.2 percent and total agricultural output
18Table4: ImpactofTariffCutsonRegionalOutput, Exports, ImportsandDemand
for Products from Other Regions—No Control on Trade Balance
WTO agreement WTO agreement plus agri. protection
Sectorsa
Eastern Central Western National Eastern Central Western National
Output
agri 0.00 -0.13 -0.08 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03
mine -1.73 1.24 2.60 -0.03 -1.49 1.24 2.78 0.12
fprc -4.20 -1.71 -5.35 -3.59 -5.33 -1.80 -5.41 -4.24
lind 7.68 0.04 2.79 5.86 7.35 -0.22 1.34 5.47
chem -2.02 -0.96 -0.75 -1.63 -1.92 -0.95 -0.75 -1.57
motr -17.88 -14.87 -11.54 -16.37 -17.62 -14.71 -11.12 -16.10
mche -3.86 -0.95 0.29 -2.76 -3.61 -0.90 0.49 -2.56
elen 5.72 -0.85 3.10 4.98 6.43 -0.79 3.49 5.61
cnst 0.46 1.09 1.18 0.72 0.44 1.04 1.16 0.69
svce 0.82 -0.13 0.15 0.52 0.75 -0.13 0.14 0.48
Exports
agri 17.19 15.07 17.41 16.56 11.45 10.88 12.57 11.39
mine 1.73 8.15 9.24 4.74 2.63 8.55 10.06 5.48
fprc 9.58 9.67 6.92 9.19 5.25 7.75 5.08 5.86
lind 21.70 8.87 19.21 20.03 20.99 8.12 14.57 19.14
chem 4.89 5.97 6.65 5.15 5.25 6.29 6.89 5.50
motr -10.31 -5.47 0.80 -7.86 -9.64 -4.95 1.71 -7.17
mche 1.20 5.82 7.47 2.60 1.92 6.32 8.21 3.29
elen 14.94 5.68 12.77 14.39 16.33 6.14 13.80 15.72
cnst 2.53 5.26 5.37 3.04 2.85 5.50 5.67 3.35
svce 2.83 4.06 4.90 3.32 3.05 4.29 5.17 3.54
Imports
agri 47.47 39.20 63.54 47.97 15.25 11.36 20.17 15.21
mine -4.45 -4.95 -4.38 -4.53 -4.86 -5.37 -4.76 -4.93
fprc 155.48 173.44 158.17 158.30 161.79 177.93 162.41 163.94
lind 22.54 11.02 5.03 19.02 22.54 11.45 5.62 19.15
chem 22.45 19.27 20.82 21.75 22.27 19.05 20.63 21.57
motr 110.89 107.67 87.98 106.08 109.31 106.26 86.76 104.61
mche 12.55 13.41 12.59 12.69 12.11 12.86 12.06 12.22
elen 6.63 3.88 4.39 5.93 6.33 3.31 3.88 5.57
cnst -2.19 -4.06 -4.03 -3.17 -2.64 -4.44 -4.45 -3.60
svce -2.18 -4.93 -5.14 -3.44 -2.54 -5.21 -5.45 -3.77
a sector code:
agri: agriculture; mine: mining; fprc: food processing; lind: light industry; chem: chemicals; motr: motor vehicle
and other transportation equipment; mche: machinery and equipment; elen: electronics and electric equipment;
cnst: construction; svce: services.
decreases by less than 0.1 percent. This is in line with that in Ianchovichina and Martin (2001).
The smaller decline in agricultural output may be partly due to the smaller extent of the tariff cuts.
It may be also partly attributed to the aggregation of agricultural sectors. If the crop sector could be
disaggregated to individual crops, it may be that the output of some crops decreases signiﬁcantly.
The sector which has the highest growth is the apparel sector, with a more than 14 percent increase
in output. It is followed by electronics (9.93 percent), textiles (6.34 percent) and instruments and
cultural and ofﬁce machinery (3.95 percent).
The changes in imports and exports are consistent with the changes in output. Imports of other agri-
19cultural products, food and tobacco processing, motor vehicles and other transportation equipment
are more than doubled after WTO accession and crops imports increase by about 88 percent.12 On
the other hand, the increases in exports of apparel, textiles and electronics are of a smaller mag-
nitude. In general, these changes reﬂect the comparative advantage and disadvantage of Chinese
industries.
The simulation results also conﬁrm the conjecture that the eastern coastal region gains more from
the WTO accession than the inland regions. The order of increase in total utility and equivalent
variation is eastern, central and western. This suggests that regional income disparity will worsen
after the accession, although all regions may gain. For the reason discussed in Section 2, the eastern
region gains most of the beneﬁt from the expanding sectors. For example, apparel output in the
eastern region increases by over 17 percent, while this sector’s outputs in the central and western
regions increase by only 0.3 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. Similarly, textile output in the
eastern region increases the most, while it decreases in the central region.
The results show that the output level in the central region may decline after WTO accession, as
indicated by the negative change in real GDP. This result seems surprising because it is generally
perceived that the western region is the least developed region and thus it should be affected the
most. However, the result may be justiﬁed in the following way. First, the western region has the
cheapest labour, which helps in the development of labour-intensive sectors. Second, the western
region has relatively abundant resource endowments which lead to its comparative advantage in
resource-intensive products. Finally, the industrial base in the western region may not be as poor
as people think. The Chinese government has made huge investments in the so-called “third line”
program which brought about development in some sectors.
Although the western region has a higher increase in output than the central region, its welfare
gains are smaller. This is because government revenues in the western region decline after WTO
accession. Therefore, private households in the region receive lower transfers from the government,
although their real revenues from returns to factors increase.
It is also found that WTO accession will worsen rural-urban income inequality. This is a feature
common to all regions where rural households have a smaller increase in utility and welfare; which
is understandable because rural households receive part of their income from agricultural sectors
which decline in all regions after WTO accession.
4.1.2 Reduced tariff cuts in agricultural sectors
This scenario differs from the previous one in the extent of the tariff cuts in agricultural sectors,
being half of the previous level. The scenario is designed to capture some of China’s possible coun-
termeasures after WTO accession. The results are reported in the columns under “WTO agreement
plus agricultural protection” in Tables 3 and 4. Several points are evident from these results.
First, such policy actions do provide some cushioning effects to agricultural sectors. The increase in
agricultural imports does decline sharply, falling from 47.3 percent to 15.2 percent. Consequently,
agricultural output declines by only 0.03 percent. Second, because the central region is the major
12It should be noted that China’s crop imports account for only about 1.3 percent of total imports in the baseline, and
after the 88 percent increase crop imports are still small in absolute terms.
20Table 5: Macroeconomic Effects of Tariff Cuts–No Change in Trade Balance
WTO agreement WTO agreement plus agricultural protection
Indicators Eastern Central Western National Eastern Central Western National
Real GDP (%) 0.85 -0.07 0.33 0.54 0.75 -0.10 0.27 0.46
GDP deﬂator (%) 3.35 3.04 2.28 3.11 2.50 2.27 1.56 2.29
CPI (%)
Rural households 2.42 2.51 1.90 2.35 1.86 1.92 1.42 1.79
Urban households 2.55 2.82 2.33 2.57 1.89 2.05 1.60 1.88
Government 4.72 3.98 3.97 4.40 3.57 2.86 2.83 3.27
Regional average 2.48 2.64 2.10 2.45 1.87 1.98 1.50 1.83
Total utility (%)
Rural households 0.35 0.01 0.02 0.20 0.64 0.27 0.36 0.48
Urban households 1.30 0.69 1.05 1.13 1.14 0.53 0.84 0.96
Government 1.41 -2.01 -2.54 0.23 0.99 -1.97 -2.48 -0.04
Regional average 0.98 0.02 0.25 0.63 0.93 0.10 0.25 0.62
Equivalent variation (billion yuan)
Rural households 6.23 0.13 0.10 6.46 11.34 2.85 1.71 15.89
Urban households 27.08 4.66 7.53 39.26 23.72 3.60 6.03 33.36
Government 15.97 -7.07 -6.58 2.32 11.19 -6.95 -6.44 -2.19
Regional sum 49.28 -2.28 1.04 48.04 46.25 -0.50 1.31 47.06
Savings (nominal, %)
Rural households 3.58 2.97 2.28 3.26 3.05 2.44 2.00 2.75
Urban households 5.29 4.25 4.29 4.91 4.07 3.08 3.10 3.70
Government 1.63 1.85 1.32 1.64 0.50 0.80 0.27 0.51
Regional average 4.24 3.47 3.84 4.01 3.26 2.67 2.84 3.07
Nominal exchange rate 5.45 4.39
Change in trade balance (billion yuan) 0 0
Terms of trade (%) -0.47 -0.43
agricultural production area, this protection helps the central region achieve higher welfare (up
from 3.36 billion yuan to 4.12 million yuan). Third, it also helps to ease the worsening rural-urban
inequality. Rural households have a higher growth in utility than in the previous scenario while
urban households have a lower growth. Fourth, the negative impact on the trade balance and the
terms of trade is now smaller. Finally, however, the total welfare gain is smaller than for the full
tariff cuts set by the WTO agreement.
4.2 Zero Change in Trade Balance
This closure has a similar impact on regional economies, despite some differences in the macroeco-
nomic dimensions. The ﬁxed exchange rate in the previous closure brings about domestic deﬂation,
while the ﬁxed trade balance with a ﬂoating exchange rate leads to depreciation of RMB by 4.4
to 5.5 percent depending on the scenario, which in turn causes domestic inﬂation of 1.83 to 2.45
percent. In both cases, the real exchange rate increases, but in the current closure the increase is
slightly greater (2.6 to 3.0 percent versus 2.3 to 2.6 percent).
This closure has a smaller welfare gain than the previous one because it restrains the gains from
trade by ﬁxing the trade balance. Moreover, it causes an even wider welfare gap. In the previous
closure, the eastern region’s share in the total equivalent variation is 86.6 to 88.0 percent. In the
current closure, almost all the gains are absorbed by the eastern region: with additional agricultural
protection, the inland regions gain only 1.7 percent of the total equivalent variation, while they
have a net loss with the full tariff cut set by the WTO agreement. The gap between rural and urban
households is also likely to widen. Urban households’ share in the total household welfare gain
21Table6: ImpactofTariffCutsonRegionalOutput, Exports, ImportsandDemand
for Products from Other Regions—No Change in Trade Balance
WTO agreement WTO agreement plus agri. protection
Sectorsa
Eastern Central Western National Eastern Central Western National
Output
agri -0.06 -0.17 -0.12 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07
mine -1.88 1.40 2.76 -0.02 -1.62 1.37 2.91 0.12
fprc -4.33 -1.80 -5.53 -3.71 -5.42 -1.87 -5.55 -4.33
lind 7.77 0.20 3.37 6.00 7.43 -0.08 1.81 5.59
chem -2.04 -0.90 -0.69 -1.63 -1.94 -0.91 -0.69 -1.56
motr -18.05 -14.58 -11.10 -16.36 -17.76 -14.48 -10.76 -16.09
mche -3.92 -0.75 0.49 -2.73 -3.66 -0.73 0.65 -2.54
elen 5.75 -0.76 3.38 5.03 6.44 -0.71 3.73 5.65
cnst 0.43 1.11 1.20 0.72 0.42 1.06 1.17 0.69
svce 0.87 -0.22 0.07 0.52 0.80 -0.21 0.08 0.48
Exports
agri 20.21 17.83 19.90 19.44 13.88 13.11 14.60 13.72
mine 1.83 8.78 9.76 5.05 2.69 9.05 10.48 5.73
fprc 10.95 11.09 7.85 10.50 6.38 8.92 5.86 6.95
lind 22.37 9.93 21.78 20.82 21.53 8.98 16.60 19.79
chem 5.16 6.49 7.20 5.48 5.47 6.71 7.33 5.76
motr -10.37 -4.81 1.59 -7.70 -9.70 -4.42 2.36 -7.04
mche 1.32 6.45 8.01 2.84 2.01 6.83 8.65 3.48
elen 15.23 6.16 13.50 14.72 16.55 6.53 14.39 15.97
cnst 2.58 5.54 5.59 3.11 2.88 5.73 5.85 3.41
svce 2.86 4.29 5.11 3.41 3.08 4.47 5.33 3.62
Imports
agri 44.21 36.35 60.84 44.82 13.08 9.42 18.43 13.11
mine -4.72 -5.14 -4.53 -4.77 -5.07 -5.52 -4.88 -5.12
fprc 151.10 169.02 154.93 154.15 158.03 174.18 159.65 160.40
lind 21.96 9.85 4.02 18.31 22.06 10.49 4.78 18.56
chem 22.17 18.85 20.41 21.44 22.05 18.71 20.30 21.32
motr 110.06 106.43 87.27 105.17 108.68 105.28 86.20 103.90
mche 12.30 13.05 12.33 12.42 11.92 12.58 11.86 12.01
elen 6.31 3.40 4.03 5.58 6.07 2.93 3.60 5.28
cnst -2.31 -4.34 -4.25 -3.36 -2.72 -4.66 -4.62 -3.73
svce -2.31 -5.37 -5.52 -3.70 -2.64 -5.56 -5.76 -3.98
a sector code:
agri: agriculture; mine: mining; fprc: food processing; lind: light industry; chem: chemicals; motr: motor vehicle
and other transportation equipment; mche: machinery and equipment; elen: electronics and electric equipment;
cnst: construction; svce: services.
increases from 67 to 80 percent to 68 to 86 percent.
The results of the two scenarios using this closure have similar patterns to those using the previous
closure. WTO tariff cuts with additional agricultural protection lead to smaller welfare gains, but
tend to ease the widening gap between rural and urban households and between coastal and inland
regions.
225 Conclusion
Regional income disparity in China has been worsening since 1991. Using a general equilibrium
model of the Chinese economy with regional details, this paper ﬁnds that this trend will be rein-
forced rather than eased by the WTO accession. The eastern coastal region will have much higher
gains than the inland regions. The two inland regions will have similar gains with the central re-
gion being only marginally better off than the western region. It is also found that the rural-urban
inequality will worsen in all regions.
The results are robust no matter whether the trade balance is ﬁxed or not. However, keeping the
trade balance unchanged leads to smaller overall welfare gains and a wider regional income gap
than the trade balance is endogenous.
Lowering the tariff cuts in agriculture reduces the total welfare gains, although it modiﬁes the trend
of worsening inequality between rural and urban households and between regions.
Although most of the results derived by the analysis are consistent with other studies and people’s
perceptions, one should be cautious in accepting these results. Firstly, this paper discusses only
tariff cuts, rather than the whole picture implied by China’s WTO commitments. The analysis
could be extended to cover other issues, such as non-tariff barriers, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) and
domestic support. For example, the baseline tariff rates of the service sector are set at zero. Clearly
this is not the case. The simulation using the closure of no control on trade balance shows that
imports of crops increase by 84 to 88 percent, which implies that the tariff rate quota for some
crops may be binding. So the introduction of the TRQ in the model is necessary to obtain more
realistic results.
Secondly, the CERD model is a national model which suppresses international linkages and may
omit some important information. For example, it predicts that China’s apparel sector will increase
following WTO accession. However, this result is very much dependent on whether other countries
initiate the special textile safeguards. Therefore, it is appropriate to link CERD with a global model
to reﬂect these international relationships.
Thirdly, the database and parameters need to be reﬁned. For example, regional protection measures
should be introduced. Also, the agricultural sectors could be disaggregated further as the present
aggregation may hide signiﬁcant impacts on some crops.
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25A Appendix
Table A.1: Sector Classiﬁcation in the Model




03.Livestock and livestock products live
04.Fishery ﬁsh
05.Other agricultural products otha
Industry and construction
06.Coal mining and processing coal
07.Crude petroleum and natural gas
products
petr
08.Metal ore mining mtom
09.Nonmetal mineral mining nmtm




12.Wearing apparel, leather, furs, down
and related products
aprl
13.Sawmills and furniture furn
14.Paper and products, printing and
record medium reproduction
papr
15.Petroleum processing and coking ptpc
16.Chemicals chem
17.Nonmetal mineral products nmmp
18.Metals smelting and pressing mtsp
19.Metal products mtlp
20.Machinery and equipment mach
21.Transport equipment trep




24.Instruments, meters, cultural and of-
ﬁce machinery
inst
25.Maintenance and repair of machine
and equipment
main
26.Other manufacturing products omnp
27.Scrap and waste scrp
28.Electricity, steam and hot water pro-
duction and supply
powr
29.Gas production and supply gasp
30.Water production and supply watr
31.Construction cons
Services
32.Transport and warehousing tran
33.Post and telecommunication ptlc
34.Wholesale and retail trade trad
35.Eating and drinking places cate
36.Passenger transport past
37.Finance and issurance ﬁna
38.Real estate rest
39.Social services sser
40.Health services, sports and social
welfare
heth




43.General technical services teks
44.Public administration and other sec-
tors
padm
26Table A.2: Baseline and WTO Commitment Tariff Rates
Sector Baseline WTO Reduction Sector Baseline WTO Reduction
rate rate (percent) rate rate (percent)
1 crop 27.70 16.88 -39.06 23 eltn 13.54 10.00 -26.15
2 frst 2.65 2.00 -24.41 24 inst 13.54 10.00 -26.15
3 live 17.63 15.00 -14.93 25 main 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 ﬁsh 16.59 15.00 -9.59 26 omnp 26.25 15.00 -42.86
5 otha 59.01 17.00 -71.19 27 scrp 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 coal 4.97 1.26 -74.65 28 powr -0.01 0.00 0.00
7 petr 0.00 0.00 -46.24 29 gasp 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 mtom 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 watr 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 nmtm 0.44 0.00 0.00 31 cons 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 fdtp 52.90 20.00 -62.20 32 tran 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 txtl 33.49 20.00 -40.28 33 ptlc 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 aprl 25.55 25.00 -2.15 34 trad 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 furn 13.81 10.00 -27.60 35 cate 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 papr 13.19 10.00 -24.17 36 past 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 ptpc 9.09 7.00 -23.01 37 ﬁna 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 chem 15.41 5.00 -67.55 38 rest 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 nmmp 22.12 20.00 -9.60 39 sser 0.00 0.00 0.00
18 mtsp 9.85 7.00 -28.91 40 heth 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 mtlp 15.37 7.00 -54.46 41 educ 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 mach 15.62 11.00 -29.57 42 scir 0.00 0.00 0.00
21 treq 23.26 10.00 -57.01 43 teks 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 eltc 13.54 10.00 -26.15 44 padm 0.00 0.00 0.00
27Table A.3: Percentage Change in Output–No Control on Trade Balance
WTO agreement WTO agreement plus agri. protection
Sector Eastern Central Western National Eastern Central Western National
crop -1.89 -0.57 -0.81 -1.22 -0.99 -0.33 -0.47 -0.66
frst 1.84 1.34 1.52 1.60 1.04 0.94 1.01 1.00
live 2.96 0.35 1.01 1.63 1.93 0.27 0.62 1.07
ﬁsh -0.09 0.29 0.28 0.00 -0.78 -0.14 -0.02 -0.62
otha 1.18 -0.04 -0.09 0.61 0.46 0.14 -0.24 0.23
coal -1.94 0.54 0.51 -0.44 -1.85 0.52 0.52 -0.42
petr -1.05 7.74 4.36 0.89 -0.63 7.88 4.61 1.25
mtom -3.99 1.08 3.30 -0.92 -3.61 1.12 3.70 -0.66
nmtm -0.75 1.46 1.52 0.39 -0.63 1.45 1.51 0.44
fdtp -4.20 -1.71 -5.35 -3.59 -5.33 -1.80 -5.41 -4.24
txtl 8.11 -1.20 7.46 6.34 7.46 -1.87 3.79 5.48
aprl 17.14 0.27 1.49 14.42 16.59 0.03 0.60 13.90
furn 0.51 1.36 1.16 0.81 0.54 1.35 1.11 0.82
papr 1.92 -0.11 -0.80 1.32 1.94 -0.17 -1.00 1.31
ptpc -1.30 0.66 2.34 -0.41 -1.20 0.65 2.50 -0.32
chem -3.05 -3.89 -3.07 -3.21 -2.94 -3.86 -3.12 -3.13
nmmp -0.16 1.40 1.27 0.52 -0.08 1.37 1.29 0.56
mtsp -4.89 -0.51 1.29 -2.73 -4.55 -0.45 1.53 -2.48
mtlp -2.82 -1.95 -2.63 -2.66 -2.59 -1.91 -2.58 -2.47
mach -3.98 -1.10 -0.78 -3.15 -3.77 -1.04 -0.58 -2.97
treq -17.88 -14.87 -11.54 -16.37 -17.62 -14.71 -11.12 -16.10
eltc 0.52 0.23 0.73 0.50 0.77 0.27 0.85 0.72
eltn 11.04 -2.99 5.62 9.93 12.15 -2.94 6.21 10.95
inst 5.24 -2.38 -0.93 3.95 6.24 -2.17 -0.45 4.82
main -0.46 -0.13 0.86 -0.16 -0.47 -0.14 0.87 -0.17
omnp -0.87 0.94 -0.06 -0.30 -0.74 0.86 -0.36 -0.26
scrp -3.22 -1.08 4.86 -1.88 -2.95 -1.07 4.80 -1.71
powr -0.45 0.10 0.40 -0.19 -0.43 0.07 0.41 -0.18
gasp 1.16 1.25 0.89 1.15 1.00 1.04 0.89 0.99
watr 0.54 0.03 0.24 0.38 0.49 0.02 0.17 0.34
cons 0.46 1.09 1.18 0.72 0.44 1.04 1.16 0.69
tran 0.06 0.41 0.99 0.25 0.07 0.40 0.96 0.25
ptlc 1.19 0.30 0.52 0.93 1.13 0.27 0.51 0.88
trad 0.59 0.08 1.14 0.56 0.58 0.07 1.12 0.55
cate 1.71 0.63 0.67 1.32 1.50 0.54 0.59 1.15
past 0.76 0.47 0.97 0.71 0.78 0.49 0.99 0.73
ﬁna 0.17 0.06 0.49 0.20 0.14 0.02 0.43 0.17
rest 1.17 0.45 0.69 0.98 1.11 0.45 0.73 0.95
sser 1.50 0.30 0.31 1.16 1.48 0.31 0.30 1.14
heth 2.05 -0.80 -0.66 0.84 1.80 -0.82 -0.66 0.70
educ 1.49 -0.79 -0.72 0.61 1.30 -0.76 -0.70 0.50
scir 0.55 -1.81 -1.89 -0.26 0.55 -1.81 -1.82 -0.25
teks 0.68 -1.44 -1.67 -0.14 0.48 -1.41 -1.58 -0.25
padm 1.87 -1.97 -2.53 0.16 1.57 -1.91 -2.46 0.01
28Table A.4: Percentage Change in Exports–No Control on Trade Balance
WTO agreement WTO agreement plus agri. protection
Sector Eastern Central Western National Eastern Central Western National
crop 17.01 15.18 17.08 16.52 11.29 11.02 12.40 11.33
frst 13.40 12.93 15.23 13.39 8.96 9.07 10.83 9.13
live 20.60 15.60 18.67 18.20 13.35 11.20 13.29 12.44
ﬁsh 17.36 15.38 17.51 16.60 12.71 10.98 12.50 12.05
otha 16.50 13.18 17.15 15.71 10.62 9.99 12.59 10.73
coal 0.85 6.67 7.22 5.84 1.44 7.02 7.75 6.24
petr 1.81 13.01 9.47 4.15 2.79 13.69 10.33 5.09
mtom -0.54 7.74 9.24 4.41 0.32 8.21 10.17 5.15
nmtm 1.90 8.22 8.72 5.60 2.51 8.58 9.14 6.06
fdtp 9.58 9.67 6.92 9.19 5.25 7.75 5.08 5.86
txtl 20.88 9.54 23.13 19.45 19.61 7.85 16.87 17.68
aprl 30.28 9.15 13.92 28.59 29.35 8.52 11.87 27.67
furn 5.84 8.34 9.47 6.60 6.06 8.53 9.53 6.81
papr 8.40 7.05 8.29 8.26 8.67 7.06 7.81 8.48
ptpc 1.54 5.90 8.33 3.39 2.14 6.31 9.09 3.99
chem 5.39 4.10 5.84 5.31 5.70 4.33 5.85 5.59
nmmp 3.43 8.00 8.06 5.44 4.03 8.39 8.56 5.95
mtsp -1.16 5.89 7.91 3.24 -0.34 6.39 8.68 3.96
mtlp 2.13 4.97 4.46 2.34 2.83 5.45 4.99 3.02
mach 1.12 6.15 7.30 2.31 1.82 6.66 8.02 2.98
treq -10.31 -5.47 0.80 -7.86 -9.64 -4.95 1.71 -7.17
eltc 6.15 7.41 8.15 6.31 6.89 7.88 8.76 7.03
eltn 20.14 3.82 14.32 19.16 21.83 4.25 15.43 20.76
inst 11.68 4.44 6.28 11.18 13.20 5.02 7.23 12.64
main 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
omnp 5.80 8.42 8.52 6.50 6.29 8.57 8.06 6.88
scrp 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
powr 2.34 5.57 5.51 4.04 2.91 6.03 6.12 4.58
gasp 3.17 5.25 4.86 3.41 3.32 5.30 5.22 3.59
watr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cons 2.53 5.26 5.37 3.04 2.85 5.50 5.67 3.35
tran 1.56 4.21 4.85 2.56 1.90 4.50 5.18 2.89
ptlc 2.78 3.36 4.12 3.08 3.09 3.65 4.46 3.39
trad 2.23 3.69 5.05 3.04 2.48 3.96 5.28 3.29
cate 6.27 5.77 6.98 6.13 5.50 5.29 6.50 5.45
past 2.72 4.30 4.79 3.57 3.03 4.62 5.11 3.88
ﬁna 1.90 3.34 3.86 1.95 2.22 3.59 4.12 2.27
rest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
sser 3.65 4.15 4.62 3.71 3.90 4.37 4.86 3.96
heth 5.92 4.27 4.16 5.88 5.93 4.50 4.45 5.90
educ 2.64 2.59 3.03 2.64 2.79 2.93 3.42 2.80
scir 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
teks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
padm 3.57 1.50 0.87 1.83 3.57 1.86 1.33 2.12
29Table A.5: Percentage Change in Imports–No Control on Trade Balance
WTO agreement WTO agreement plus agri. protection
Sector Eastern Central Western National Eastern Central Western National
crop 86.02 95.08 91.48 87.77 30.33 32.80 31.06 30.71
frst -8.21 -8.22 -9.74 -8.27 -6.59 -6.60 -8.01 -6.64
live -3.11 -3.11 -5.17 -3.35 -3.59 -4.80 -6.38 -4.06
ﬁsh -10.90 -7.02 -9.95 -10.53 -11.12 -6.70 -9.07 -10.61
otha 299.33 306.77 285.04 301.77 83.18 83.46 75.49 83.03
coal 14.83 12.28 12.32 14.34 14.24 11.80 11.68 13.76
petr -4.11 -3.58 -4.70 -4.07 -4.56 -4.02 -5.25 -4.53
mtom -7.04 -7.01 -3.76 -6.15 -7.25 -7.41 -4.01 -6.41
nmtm -3.71 -7.18 -6.67 -4.75 -4.20 -7.57 -7.13 -5.22
fdtp 155.48 173.44 158.17 158.30 161.79 177.93 162.41 163.94
txtl 42.07 34.88 27.90 40.36 42.22 35.78 29.19 40.67
aprl -19.38 -15.66 -18.98 -18.51 -18.99 -15.10 -17.96 -17.97
furn 11.77 10.26 9.61 11.35 11.49 9.94 9.42 11.08
papr 5.18 3.65 0.97 4.28 4.91 3.54 1.04 4.08
ptpc 3.84 2.79 2.77 3.37 3.47 2.45 2.34 3.00
chem 25.91 27.27 26.95 26.19 25.78 27.11 26.85 26.07
nmmp 5.17 1.68 2.44 4.52 4.60 1.19 1.92 3.96
mtsp 5.34 5.04 5.46 5.31 5.03 4.50 4.88 4.95
mtlp 34.92 34.93 33.34 34.74 34.25 34.25 32.62 34.06
mach 12.25 12.64 10.70 12.10 11.78 12.11 10.22 11.62
treq 110.89 107.67 87.98 106.08 109.31 106.26 86.76 104.61
eltc 8.81 7.10 8.02 8.45 8.25 6.54 7.49 7.89
eltn 6.66 2.70 3.51 5.71 6.48 2.09 2.98 5.42
inst 2.97 4.50 3.26 3.29 2.43 4.11 2.89 2.81
main 0.00 -8.53 -9.61 -7.65 0.00 -9.00 -10.10 -8.05
omnp 47.91 49.51 47.19 47.95 47.27 49.06 47.25 47.37
scrp -3.17 -3.48 0.00 -2.01 -3.67 -4.18 0.00 -2.37
powr -3.66 -6.17 -5.35 -4.51 -4.25 -6.71 -5.97 -5.08
gasp -2.49 -5.92 -6.41 -4.70 -3.19 -6.56 -6.97 -5.34
watr -2.84 -6.34 -5.83 -4.50 -3.47 -6.85 -6.52 -5.10
cons -2.19 -4.06 -4.03 -3.17 -2.64 -4.44 -4.45 -3.60
tran -1.85 -5.08 -4.41 -3.61 -2.29 -5.47 -4.90 -4.05
ptlc -1.13 -4.05 -4.46 -2.68 -1.70 -4.50 -4.91 -3.19
trad 0.00 -5.34 -5.15 -4.64 0.00 -5.73 -5.52 -4.98
cate -4.42 -6.38 -7.08 -4.90 -3.91 -5.98 -6.70 -4.41
past -1.78 -5.47 -4.87 -3.08 -2.19 -5.83 -5.25 -3.48
ﬁna -1.71 -3.98 -3.66 -3.52 -2.18 -4.37 -4.10 -3.94
rest -0.87 -1.99 -2.18 -1.39 -1.31 -2.46 -2.61 -1.84
sser -2.14 -4.87 -5.34 -3.37 -2.59 -5.13 -5.64 -3.75
heth -2.80 -7.11 -6.67 -5.25 -3.35 -7.37 -6.99 -5.65
educ -0.05 -5.04 -5.40 -2.93 -0.67 -5.36 -5.80 -3.40
scir -2.06 -7.03 -6.64 -5.68 -2.49 -7.27 -6.93 -5.99
teks -0.57 -6.11 0.00 -2.28 -0.97 -6.33 0.00 -2.52
padm -0.25 -6.20 -6.82 -3.23 -0.91 -6.52 -7.20 -3.72
30Table A.6: Percentage Change in Output–No Change in Trade Balance
WTO agreement WTO agreement plus agri. protection
Sector Eastern Central Western National Eastern Central Western National
crop -1.90 -0.58 -0.78 -1.22 -1.00 -0.34 -0.45 -0.67
frst 2.20 1.54 1.66 1.86 1.35 1.11 1.13 1.22
live 2.88 0.27 0.88 1.54 1.88 0.21 0.51 1.01
ﬁsh -0.34 0.11 -0.07 -0.23 -0.97 -0.28 -0.30 -0.80
otha 1.07 -0.25 -0.12 0.49 0.38 -0.03 -0.26 0.14
coal -2.21 0.61 0.53 -0.52 -2.08 0.58 0.54 -0.48
petr -1.10 8.47 4.59 0.96 -0.69 8.47 4.80 1.30
mtom -4.11 1.39 3.62 -0.82 -3.72 1.38 3.96 -0.57
nmtm -0.90 1.57 1.54 0.36 -0.76 1.54 1.52 0.41
fdtp -4.33 -1.80 -5.53 -3.71 -5.42 -1.87 -5.55 -4.33
txtl 8.40 -0.66 9.23 6.79 7.71 -1.42 5.18 5.85
aprl 17.29 0.18 1.32 14.53 16.72 -0.04 0.48 14.00
furn 0.35 1.35 1.05 0.69 0.40 1.34 1.03 0.72
papr 1.96 -0.11 -0.75 1.35 1.97 -0.17 -0.96 1.33
ptpc -1.41 0.80 2.48 -0.43 -1.29 0.77 2.61 -0.34
chem -3.01 -3.85 -2.96 -3.16 -2.91 -3.82 -3.03 -3.09
nmmp -0.29 1.45 1.24 0.46 -0.19 1.42 1.27 0.51
mtsp -5.02 -0.24 1.51 -2.71 -4.66 -0.23 1.72 -2.46
mtlp -2.83 -1.86 -2.57 -2.65 -2.60 -1.83 -2.52 -2.47
mach -4.00 -0.91 -0.54 -3.10 -3.79 -0.88 -0.38 -2.93
treq -18.05 -14.58 -11.10 -16.36 -17.76 -14.48 -10.76 -16.09
eltc 0.37 0.31 0.84 0.39 0.65 0.34 0.94 0.63
eltn 11.22 -2.92 6.04 10.13 12.28 -2.88 6.56 11.10
inst 5.45 -2.15 -0.63 4.17 6.40 -1.99 -0.21 4.98
main -0.51 -0.10 0.87 -0.18 -0.51 -0.11 0.88 -0.19
omnp -1.11 1.08 -0.02 -0.41 -0.94 0.97 -0.31 -0.35
scrp -3.34 -1.01 5.12 -1.91 -3.05 -1.01 5.02 -1.74
powr -0.62 0.13 0.46 -0.28 -0.57 0.10 0.46 -0.26
gasp 0.48 0.38 0.75 0.49 0.45 0.33 0.78 0.46
watr 0.36 -0.16 0.09 0.20 0.34 -0.14 0.06 0.20
cons 0.43 1.11 1.20 0.72 0.42 1.06 1.17 0.69
tran -0.05 0.48 1.05 0.20 -0.02 0.45 1.01 0.21
ptlc 0.98 0.08 0.32 0.72 0.96 0.09 0.35 0.71
trad 0.40 0.07 1.14 0.44 0.43 0.07 1.12 0.46
cate 1.46 0.34 0.35 1.05 1.30 0.30 0.33 0.93
past 0.66 0.33 0.91 0.60 0.69 0.38 0.95 0.64
ﬁna -0.09 0.08 0.58 0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.50 0.03
rest 0.79 -0.03 0.37 0.59 0.81 0.06 0.47 0.63
sser 1.59 0.20 0.21 1.19 1.55 0.23 0.23 1.17
heth 2.47 -1.02 -1.02 0.96 2.15 -1.00 -0.95 0.80
educ 1.95 -1.11 -1.06 0.75 1.67 -1.01 -0.98 0.62
scir 1.18 -1.86 -1.92 0.14 1.06 -1.85 -1.84 0.07
teks 1.63 -1.51 -1.73 0.44 1.25 -1.47 -1.63 0.22
padm 3.33 -2.04 -2.60 0.98 2.76 -1.98 -2.52 0.68
31Table A.7: Percentage Change in Exports–No Change in Trade Balance
WTO agreement WTO agreement plus agri. protection
Sector Eastern Central Western National Eastern Central Western National
crop 20.01 17.91 19.52 19.39 13.71 13.23 14.40 13.65
frst 15.89 15.46 17.73 15.89 10.99 11.13 12.87 11.17
live 23.79 18.38 21.22 21.11 15.89 13.44 15.37 14.79
ﬁsh 20.84 18.62 20.30 19.99 15.49 13.59 14.75 14.76
otha 19.40 15.40 19.79 18.39 12.95 11.81 14.74 12.90
coal 0.67 7.19 7.56 6.24 1.28 7.43 8.02 6.55
petr 1.95 14.14 10.01 4.44 2.88 14.60 10.77 5.31
mtom -0.54 8.47 9.86 4.79 0.31 8.79 10.68 5.46
nmtm 1.86 8.79 9.10 5.91 2.47 9.04 9.46 6.31
fdtp 10.95 11.09 7.85 10.50 6.38 8.92 5.86 6.95
txtl 21.75 11.20 26.51 20.66 20.33 9.21 19.52 18.67
aprl 31.07 9.92 14.74 29.37 30.00 9.15 12.57 28.32
furn 5.97 8.88 9.88 6.84 6.16 8.98 9.87 7.01
papr 8.72 7.62 8.93 8.62 8.93 7.53 8.34 8.76
ptpc 1.60 6.41 8.81 3.59 2.18 6.71 9.48 4.14
chem 5.71 4.64 6.45 5.66 5.96 4.76 6.34 5.88
nmmp 3.45 8.50 8.38 5.66 4.03 8.79 8.82 6.12
mtsp -1.16 6.56 8.45 3.57 -0.35 6.93 9.12 4.22
mtlp 2.28 5.47 4.88 2.52 2.94 5.85 5.32 3.16
mach 1.25 6.74 7.88 2.53 1.91 7.13 8.49 3.15
treq -10.37 -4.81 1.59 -7.70 -9.70 -4.42 2.36 -7.04
eltc 6.19 7.92 8.61 6.40 6.91 8.29 9.14 7.08
eltn 20.54 4.23 15.11 19.60 22.13 4.57 16.08 21.10
inst 12.07 5.05 6.88 11.58 13.49 5.50 7.72 12.94
main 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
omnp 5.78 9.15 9.19 6.68 6.26 9.16 8.62 7.01
scrp 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
powr 2.35 6.00 5.87 4.26 2.91 6.37 6.40 4.74
gasp 2.58 4.63 4.92 2.91 2.84 4.80 5.27 3.18
watr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cons 2.58 5.54 5.59 3.11 2.88 5.73 5.85 3.41
tran 1.51 4.51 5.10 2.63 1.85 4.74 5.38 2.94
ptlc 2.68 3.36 4.12 3.02 3.01 3.65 4.45 3.33
trad 2.15 3.94 5.28 3.08 2.41 4.16 5.47 3.32
cate 6.49 6.08 7.13 6.37 5.69 5.55 6.64 5.66
past 2.70 4.39 4.94 3.62 3.01 4.69 5.23 3.92
ﬁna 1.75 3.62 4.18 1.81 2.09 3.81 4.37 2.15
rest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
sser 3.84 4.33 4.75 3.90 4.05 4.51 4.96 4.11
heth 6.42 4.29 3.98 6.37 6.34 4.51 4.30 6.30
educ 3.12 2.49 2.84 3.10 3.17 2.84 3.26 3.16
scir 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
teks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
padm 5.08 1.64 0.95 2.41 4.80 1.97 1.38 2.59
32Table A.8: Percentage Change in Imports–No Change in Trade Balance
WTO agreement WTO agreement plus agri. protection
Sector Eastern Central Western National Eastern Central Western National
crop 81.98 91.39 88.52 83.91 27.91 30.69 29.32 28.41
frst -9.98 -10.30 -11.72 -10.12 -8.11 -8.39 -9.71 -8.23
live -5.65 -5.31 -7.16 -5.79 -5.72 -6.61 -8.04 -6.09
ﬁsh -14.25 -10.16 -12.83 -13.82 -13.90 -9.34 -11.51 -13.34
otha 286.96 296.73 275.51 290.42 78.42 79.67 71.81 78.68
coal 14.38 11.71 11.94 13.87 13.88 11.35 11.38 13.40
petr -4.38 -3.70 -4.94 -4.32 -4.77 -4.11 -5.44 -4.72
mtom -7.27 -7.21 -3.80 -6.33 -7.43 -7.56 -4.04 -6.55
nmtm -3.99 -7.60 -7.03 -5.07 -4.41 -7.90 -7.42 -5.46
fdtp 151.10 169.02 154.93 154.15 158.03 174.18 159.65 160.40
txtl 41.50 33.63 26.62 39.68 41.76 34.74 28.11 40.10
aprl -20.60 -17.36 -20.58 -19.90 -19.99 -16.50 -19.29 -19.12
furn 11.18 9.41 8.86 10.71 11.01 9.25 8.81 10.56
papr 4.95 3.13 0.49 3.97 4.73 3.13 0.65 3.83
ptpc 3.62 2.59 2.55 3.15 3.30 2.30 2.17 2.84
chem 25.64 26.75 26.49 25.87 25.56 26.69 26.48 25.80
nmmp 4.88 1.13 2.01 4.19 4.37 0.76 1.58 3.70
mtsp 5.05 4.72 5.21 5.02 4.81 4.26 4.69 4.73
mtlp 34.57 34.41 32.87 34.34 33.98 33.84 32.25 33.75
mach 12.04 12.29 10.48 11.87 11.61 11.83 10.04 11.44
treq 110.06 106.43 87.27 105.17 108.68 105.28 86.20 103.90
eltc 8.36 6.52 7.65 7.98 7.89 6.08 7.20 7.52
eltn 6.37 2.21 3.11 5.37 6.25 1.70 2.66 5.15
inst 2.67 4.18 3.05 3.00 2.20 3.85 2.73 2.58
main -3.47 -8.86 -9.90 -8.48 -3.74 -9.25 -10.31 -8.86
omnp 47.24 48.15 46.07 47.19 46.73 47.96 46.33 46.77
scrp -3.39 -3.66 -3.09 -3.36 -3.82 -4.30 -3.22 -3.74
powr -4.02 -6.56 -5.60 -4.86 -4.52 -7.01 -6.16 -5.36
gasp -3.24 -7.14 -6.78 -5.42 -3.78 -7.53 -7.27 -5.91
watr -3.17 -6.89 -6.26 -4.92 -3.72 -7.29 -6.85 -5.43
cons -2.31 -4.34 -4.25 -3.36 -2.72 -4.66 -4.62 -3.73
tran -2.02 -5.33 -4.60 -3.82 -2.43 -5.67 -5.05 -4.21
ptlc -1.48 -4.55 -4.89 -3.09 -1.97 -4.90 -5.25 -3.51
trad -1.92 -5.69 -5.48 -5.15 -2.22 -6.00 -5.78 -5.46
cate -5.23 -7.40 -7.89 -5.72 -4.58 -6.83 -7.37 -5.10
past -1.98 -5.94 -5.22 -3.36 -2.35 -6.20 -5.53 -3.70
ﬁna -2.09 -4.24 -3.82 -3.77 -2.48 -4.58 -4.22 -4.14
rest -1.38 -2.67 -2.70 -1.96 -1.72 -3.00 -3.02 -2.29
sser -2.22 -5.32 -5.71 -3.60 -2.65 -5.49 -5.94 -3.92
heth -2.48 -7.62 -7.25 -5.46 -3.08 -7.78 -7.46 -5.81
educ 0.35 -5.64 -5.94 -3.09 -0.33 -5.84 -6.24 -3.51
scir -1.49 -7.40 -6.90 -5.78 -2.02 -7.56 -7.14 -6.06
teks 0.37 -6.50 -3.47 -2.83 -0.18 -6.64 -3.61 -3.15
padm 1.08 -6.58 -7.14 -2.75 0.17 -6.81 -7.45 -3.32
33